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SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL




DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON**
”Among the theories of  jurists,  there is,  perhaps,  none which has been a  
battle-ground for so long a time, as that which relates to the limits of sover-
eign power.”1
1. INTRODUCTION
More than once has the concept of sovereignty been declared as passé, ob-
solete unworkable or even dead, due to societal or technological develop-
ments.  This  article  focuses  on the extent  to  which  the Internet  has  chal-
lenged, and continues to challenge, the concept of sovereignty. Focusing on 
sovereignty  in  the  context  of  control  over  Internet  conduct,  it  seeks  to 
demonstrate that, while the Internet has challenged sovereignty to a degree, 
geo-location  –  the  identification  of  the  geographical  location  of  Internet 
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(November  2013, Dan Svantesson,  Celebrating  20  years  of  WWW – a  reflection  on the 
concept of jurisdiction, Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6 No. 1 (2012); 
pp. 177-190, and Dan Svantesson, Time for the law to take Internet geo-location technolo-
gies seriously, Journal of Private International Law Vol 8 No 3 (December 2012); pp. 473-487. 
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1 A. Lawrence Lowell, The Limits of Sovereignty, 2 Harvard Law Review 70 (1888-1889), at 70.
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users – is  a ‘game-changer’ re-emphasising the significance of geography 
and implicitly the significance of (territorial) sovereignty. 
The paper then makes a proposal for a potential future direction for the 
concept of sovereignty in the Internet context. More specifically, I seek to in-
troduce  a  doctrine  of  “market  sovereignty”  backed  up  by  what  can  be 
termed “market destroying measures”.
However, first of all, I want to draw attention to a recent case of relev-
ance for the topic under discussion. As odd as it may sound, the case in-
volves a trespassing dog that almost shut down Facebook in Brazil. 
Put briefly, the background facts are as follows. A dog was said to have 
trespassed onto a neighbour’s land. As a result some potentially defamatory 
remarks were posted on a Facebook site. This resulted in an injunction be-
ing sought to have the potentially  offending content  removed. Facebook 
Brazil first objected, pointing to standard arguments such as that it does not 
control the content and infrastructure adding that:  “[the task of managing 
content and infrastructure] is  the responsibility of two other distinct and 
autonomous  companies,  called  Facebook  Inc  and  Facebook  Ireland  Ltd, 
located in the United States and Ireland respectively.”2   
This response did not please the Court:
Judge Bonvicino stated that Facebook's reply was an ‘outrageous dis-
regard’ of Brazilian sovereignty, which is ‘aggravated by the notori-
ous spying activities of the US government.’  The Judge also noted 
that ‘Facebook is not a sovereign country superior to Brazil.’ Hence, 
the Court concluded that if  Facebook wants to operate in Brazil,  it 
must be subject to the Brazilian laws, regardless of where the parent 
companies are incorporated.3
Facebook was given 48 hours to remove the discussion. Failure to com-
ply would result in “the judge ordered the Brazilian telecoms to block all 
Facebook IP domains and redirect them to a courtesy page displaying the 
2 Giancarlo Frosio, A Brazilian Judge Orders Facebook off Air if It Fails to Remove a Defam-
atory  Discussion  (October  7,  2013)  http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/10/brazili-
an-judge-orders-facebook-air-if-it-fails-remove-defamatory-discussion.
3 Giancarlo Frosio, A Brazilian Judge Orders Facebook off Air if It Fails to Remove a Defam-
atory  Discussion  (October  7,  2013)  http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/10/brazili-
an-judge-orders-facebook-air-if-it-fails-remove-defamatory-discussion.
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court order.”4 In the end, however, Facebook complied with the order and 
removed the content in question. 
Blogging  about  the  matter,  Giancarlo  Frosio  has  pointed  out  that: 
“Brazilian courts ought to be careful in threatening to shut down entire plat-
forms  over  individual  disputes.  Tainted  by  nationalistic  bias,  these  de-
cisions may overlook the fact that millions of Brazilian users,  businesses, 
and institutions, including the Tribunal of São Paulo, are using those plat-
forms daily.”5 This is an important point, and I will have reason to return to 
both that remark as such, and the case in general, in the below. 
Before proceeding, it is important to distinguish between sovereignty in 
the context of states being able, or unable, to control Internet conduct on the 
one hand, and sovereignty in the context of states being able, or unable, to 
control Internet technology on the other. The first matter is, as noted, the topic 
of this paper. However, a few introductory remarks are needed about the 
latter. 
2. SOVEREIGNTY OVER CONDUCT OR SOVEREIGNTY OVER 
THE TECHNOLOGY?
Never in human history have we seen a technology that plays such a large 
and diverse part in society as does the Internet. Importantly, this technology 
– including fundamental matters such as what that technology can, and can-
not, do – are largely in the hands of technology developers rather than in 
the hands of individual sovereign nation states. Only states with extremely 
strong determination, and with a lacking concern about their citizens miss-
ing out on certain online facilities, are able to exercise a relatively high level 
of control in respect of Internet technology. They do so, for example, by re-
stricting international Internet communications to flow only through gov-
ernmentally controlled channels, by blocking foreign content and by ban-
ning some technologies.
Open democratic  states have a much harder time controlling  Internet 
technology. Lessig brought popular attention to, and increased understand-
ing of, the fact that the Internet is being regulated both through law and 
technical developments in his widely read,  Code and Other Laws of  Cyber-
4 Giancarlo Frosio, A Brazilian Judge Orders Facebook off Air if It Fails to Remove a Defam-
atory  Discussion  (October  7,  2013)  http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/10/brazili-
an-judge-orders-facebook-air-if-it-fails-remove-defamatory-discussion.
5 Giancarlo Frosio, A Brazilian Judge Orders Facebook off Air if It Fails to Remove a Defam-
atory  Discussion  (October  7,  2013)  http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/10/brazili-
an-judge-orders-facebook-air-if-it-fails-remove-defamatory-discussion.
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space,6 but many of his main ideas were presented already in an earlier art-
icle:
I said that we could understand regulation in real space as a function 
of four sorts of constraints-law, norms,  markets,  and what I called 
real space code. We can understand regulation in cyberspace in the 
same  way.  Regulation  in  cyberspace  is  a  function  of  similar  con-
straints. It too is a function of the constraints of law, of norms, of the 
market, and of what I will call, ‘code.’7
While Lessig outlines four mechanisms for regulation, only the relation 
between legal code and computer code is of relevance here, and in referring 
to architecture as ‘code’, Lessig states that:
[o]nce it is plain that code can replace law, the pedigree of the code-
writers becomes central. Code in essence becomes an alternative sov-
ereign -- since it is in essence an alternative structure of regulation. 
But  who  authors  this  sovereign  authority?  And  with  what 
legitimacy?8 
In this sense, the Internet still challenges sovereignty – a state may be 
able to control most technologies used with its territory, for example by pla-
cing restrictions on the import of certain types of technologies – but in the 
case of the Internet, states are forced to accept the technology as is provided, 
without being able to influence it, to a greater degree. In a sense, what we 
are dealing with here can be viewed as an illustration of a situation in which 
states, to obtain what they see as useful from Internet technology, also have 
to accept the parts they which to exercise their right of sovereignty to avoid. 
Having made these observations, I can return to the main topic of sover-
eignty in the context of states being able, or unable, to control Internet con-
duct.
6 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
7 Lawrence Lessig’s 1997 working draft of  The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach 
(Stanford Technology Law Review  -  no  longer  available  online). See  further:  Lawrence 
Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harvard Law Review 501(1999), 
at 506-508.
8 Lawrence Lessig,  The Law Of The Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach (as referred to in: Gra-
ham Greenleaf,  An Endnote on Regulating Cyberspace: Architecture vs Law? (1998) University 
of New South Wales Law Journal, Volume 21, Number 2).
2014] D. J. B. Svantesson: Sovereignty in international law 141
3. THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW
If one accepts the somewhat artificially ascertained time of birth of the ‘sov-
ereign nation state’  as being the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of West-
phalia, ‘sovereignty’ (in that sense) is now 365 years old.9 It is, thus, only 
healthy that it is subject to discussion and analysis at regular intervals.
Some articles deal with the concept of sovereignty in international law in 
great detail. Here it suffices to make a few relatively rudimentary observa-
tions about the concept of sovereignty in international law so as to lay the 
foundation for the discussion to come below in this article.
First of all, it may be noted that ‘sovereignty’ as a concept is both easy 
and hard to define. If one is content with a relatively basic, functional and 
arguably superficial definition, one need only turn to a legal dictionary, or 
standard text on public international law, to find that sovereignty10 means 
something along the lines of “the ability of a state to act without external 
controls on the conduct of its affairs.”11 Or, as Endicott puts it: 
Sovereignty, it seems, is: 
• absolute power within a community, and
• absolute independence externally, and
• full power as a legal person in international law.12
Or even more usefully as prominent commentator Brownlie puts it: 
The corollaries of the sovereignty and equality of states are: (a) a jur-
isdiction, prima facie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent 
population living there; (b) a duty of non-intervention in the area of 
exclusive jurisdiction of other states; and (3) the ultimate dependence 
upon consent of obligations arising whether from customary law or 
from treaties.13 
9 The theory of sovereignty dates back at least to 1576. See further: Hessel E. Yntema, The His-
toric Bases of Private International Law, 2 Am.J.Comp.L., 297 (1953), at 305.
10 It is important to note that we here are focusing on legal sovereignty,  rather than what 
Steinberg has termed “behavioral sovereignty”, see further: Richard H. Steinberg, Who is 
Sovereign?, 40 Stanford Journal of International Law 330 (2004).
11 James R. Fox, Dictionary of International and Comparative Law 2nd Ed. (Oceana Publica-
tions Inc, 1997, Dobbs Ferry, New York). 
12 Timothy Endicott, The Logic of Freedom and Power, in Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas  
(eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford, Oxford Unbiversity Press, 2010), at 245.
13 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 8th Ed. (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2012, Oxford), at 447.
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At the same time, if one allows oneself to ‘dig deeper’ it soon becomes 
clear that there is a degree of disagreement as to the exact delineation of the 
concept of sovereignty, and attempts at a precise definition may be as fruit-
less as they are frustrating.14 One of the reasons for this is that, there is more 
than one conception of sovereignty.15 Another reason is to be found in the 
fact that, the term carries more than one meaning16 and debates about the 
meaning of sovereignty have taken place on a variety of arenas.  For ex-
ample, arguably the most intense discussions of the meaning of sovereignty 
have taken place in the context of the source(s) and limitation(s) of sover-
eignty in the sense of whether a sovereign’s rights are unfettered.17 Here, we 
need not busy ourselves with that discussion.  
A more potent way for us to approach the concept of sovereignty is to do 
so  from  the  angle  of  Olivecrona’s  perspective  on  rights.  Discussing  the 
meaning, or lack thereof, of the terms “rights” and “duties”, Olivecrona ob-
served that:
The sentence that A is the owner of this piece of land functions as a 
permissive sign for himself  with regard to this  piece  of land; at  the 
same time it acts as a prohibitive sign for everybody else. The sentence 
is a green light for the owner, a red light for the others.18
Applying this to the concept of sovereignty it seems that international 
law provides both green lights as to what rights the sovereign nation state 
enjoys, and red lights for other states in respect of the sovereignty of a spe-
14 See e.g. Christopher Harding and C. L. Lim, The Significance of Westphalia: An Archae-
ology of the International Legal Order, in C. Harding and C.L. Lim (eds.), Essays and Com-
mentary  on  the  European  and  Conceptual  Foundations  of  Modern  International  Law 
(Kluwer Law International, 1999) at 3, noting how “to strive for an exact meaning of, for ex-
ample, ‘statehood’, ‘sovereignty’, or ‘consent’ as organising ideas of the subject [of interna-
tional law] is likely to be a fruitless task”.
15 See  e.g.  Philip  Bobbitt,  Public  International  Law,  in  Dennis  M.  Patterson  (ed.),  A 
Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell Publishers (1996), at 109-110: 
“European sovereignty proceeds by descent from that of princes whose dynastic legitimacy 
was inherited by the states that they called into being;  for this reason all  states, like all 
princes, are equal with respect to the law. American sovereignty, by contrast, derives its le-
gitimacy from its relationship to popular consent with similar consequences for the univer-
sality of international law and the equality of states, but for different reasons and, poten-
tially, with somewhat different consequences.”  
16 See e.g. James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 8th Ed. (Oxford 
University Press, 2012, Oxford), at 448, noting that “The term ‘sovereignty’ is variously used 
to describe the legal competence which states have in general, to refer to a particular func-
tion of this competence, or to provide a rationale for a particular exercise of this compet-
ence.” See also pp. 204-206 of the same work.
17 See e.g. A. Lawrence Lowell, The Limits of Sovereignty, 2 Harvard Law Review 70 (1888-1889) 
discussing whether sovereignty, in its nature, is unlimited or not.
18 Karl Olivecrona, Legal Language and Reality, in  Essays in Jurisprudence in  Honor of Roscoe  
Pound. Ed. R. A. Newman, 151–91. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. 1962, at 183.
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cific  state.  Looking  at  this  matter  from  the  perspective  of  jurisdictional 
claims over Internet conduct, however, it becomes clear that both the green 
lights and the red lights are rather blurred – or perhaps they are in fact am-
ber.19 More precisely, there are some clear and some blurred green lights, 
while all the red lights are more or less blurred, or amber.
For example, stemming in no small part from the concept of sovereignty, 
international law gives a clear green light for states to exercise jurisdiction 
over their territories (the subjective territoriality principle20) and their na-
tionals (the nationality principle21).  Further, a bit  simplified,  international 
law gives blurred green lights in relation to other grounds for jurisdiction 
somewhat less firmly rooted in sovereignty, such as objective territoriality 
principle,22 the passive personality principle,23 and the so-called effects doc-
trine.24
The red lights are fewer and more blurred, or indeed amber. However, it 
seems clear that, in establishing the principle of sovereignty and equality of 
states, Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations25, not only highlights 
that some form of territoriality principle and some form of nationality prin-
ciple are permitted under international law, it also emphasises that limits 
are placed upon these principles. As noted by Gerber:
When a state attaches legal consequences to conduct in another state, 
it exercises control over that conduct and when such control affects 
essential interests in the foreign state, it may constitute an interfer-
ence with the sovereign rights of that foreign state. Consequently, the 
19 For some potent statements about the relation between sovereignty, territory and jurisdic-
tion see e.g. Mann noting that “International jurisdiction is an aspect or an ingredient or a 
consequence of sovereignty (or of territoriality or of the principle of non-intervention – the 
difference is merely terminological). (F.A. Mann, ‘The Doctrine of Internationbal Jurisdic-
tion Revisited After Twenty Years’ (1984) 186  Recueil des Cours 9, at 20); and Steinberger 
pointing out that “Exclusivity of jurisdiction of States over their respective territiories is a 
central attribute of sovereignty.” (Helmut Steinberger, ‘Sovereignty’,  in Rudolf Bernhardt 
(ed.) Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (1987), Vol. 10, 397, at 413). 
20 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 8th Ed. (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2012, Oxford), at 458.
21 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 8th Ed. (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2012, Oxford), at 459-460.
22 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 8th Ed. (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2012, Oxford), at 458-459.
23 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 8th Ed. (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2012, Oxford), at 461.
24 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law 8th Ed. (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2012, Oxford), at 462-464.
25 Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the UN General Assembly of October 24, 1970.
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principle of non-interference is properly applicable to the exercise of 
jurisdiction.26
Or in other words “when one sovereign oversteps its bounds, it [often] 
encroaches on the prerogatives of another”27 which ought to in some case 
activate the red lights.
4. THE INTERNET WAS (INTENDED TO BE) DIFFERENT 
The Internet has a relatively short history. It is rooted in work in the late 
60’s commissioned by the US Department of Defence and only started to 
gain widespread utility in the mid 90’s. However, in its short life span it has 
had time to fundamentally change the world we live in, and indeed, how 
we live our lives in the world we live in. 
Further, despite its short life span to date, the Internet, and how we use 
it, has changed considerably over the years. Similarly, the way in which the 
law approaches the Internet and Internet conduct has changed fundament-
ally over the years. 
Elsewhere, I have identified four distinct phases showcasing very differ-
ent legal attitudes towards the application of private international law rules 
to Internet conduct starting with a kind of terra nullius thinking and now en-
tering a state of equilibrium having gone through overregulation and then a 
degree  of  under-regulation.28 That  discussion  will  not  be  repeated  here. 
However, to understand how the Internet has affected how we approach 
the concept of sovereignty, it is useful, not to say necessary, to gain some in-
sight into the broader legal thinking in relation to jurisdiction over Internet 
conduct.     
Almost 20 years ago, in 1996 Barlow famously unveiled a Declaration of  
the Independence of  Cyberspace.  One of the key features of that Declaration 
reads as follows:
Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and 
steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of 
26 David J. Gerber, Beyond Balancing: International Law Restrains on the Reach of National laws, 10 
Yale Journal of International Law 185 (1984), at 212.
27 Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,  The Internet is Changing the Public International Law System, 88 KY L. 
REV. 885 (2000), as found at http://www.kentlaw.edu/cyberlaw/perrittnetchg.html.
28 Dan Svantesson, Celebrating 20 years of WWW – a reflection on the concept of jurisdiction, 
Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6 No. 1 (2012); pp. 177-190.
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the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not wel-
come among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather...29
As I have pointed out elsewhere,30 the somewhat enigmatic quality of 
this Declaration may make it look amusingly eccentric, or even utterly ab-
surd, today. However, in fairness, it must be viewed in its context – a world 
at a time when people consciously decided to “go” online and spend time 
“in” Cyberspace for a set period of time. 
It is no doubt the case that, the world of today is different to this in that 
we do not go online as such. Cyberspace is integrated into our lives through 
a continuous Facebook presence, tablets, smart phones and Internet-connec-
ted kitchen appliances – we are experiencing a conflation of the online and 
offline world.
In any case, it is indeed difficult to imagine a clearer step away from tra-
ditional notions of state sovereignty than this Declaration, and the notion 
expressed  in  Barlow’s  Declaration can also  be found expressed,  perhaps 
more elegantly, in legal scholarly discourse; most prominently, Johnson and 
Post’s Law And Borders--The Rise of Law in Cyberspace.31 There, the authors ar-
gued that the Internet should be viewed as a separate ‘space’,32 beyond the 
control  of individual  nations’  regulation.  Moreover, the article  suggested 
that, to the extent that this separate space is to be regulated, such regula-
tions would emerge in the form of self-regulation.33
Another noteworthy example of how Internet conduct has been seen to 
be beyond the reach of sovereign states is found in Menthe’s writings on the 
Internet as an international space akin to Outer Space, the High Seas and 
Antarctica.34
Having  illustrated how there are currently  three international  spaces, 
and that ‘cyberspace’ should be the fourth, Menthe described how the ‘na-
tionality principle’ has been applied to regulate behaviour in these spaces. 
29 Barlow,  J.  P.  1996,  A  Declaration  of  the  Independence  of  Cyberspace, 
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (emphasis added).
30 Dan Svantesson, Celebrating 20 years of WWW – a reflection on the concept of jurisdiction, 
Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 6 No. 1 (2012); pp. 177-190.
31 David Johnson and David Post,  Law And Borders--The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1367 (1996).
32 David Johnson and David Post,  Law And Borders--The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1367 (1996) at 1378.
33 David Johnson and David Post,  Law And Borders--The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1367 (1996) at 1367.
34 Darrel C. Menthe,  Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces, 4  Mich. Tele-
comm. & Tech. L. Rev 69 (1998).
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In doing so he noted that all three international spaces rely on the national-
ity principle (e.g. the ‘law of the flag’ from maritime law),35 and made the 
point that “[s]imilarly, a webpage would be ascribed the nationality of its 
creator, and thus not be subject to the law of wherever it happened to be 
downloaded.”36 
Thus, on the whole Menthe must be credited with the creation of a rather 
complex and well-developed model for placing the Internet, or Cyberspace, 
beyond the direct control of the sovereign nation state.
The ideas presented by commentators such as Barlow, Menthe, Johnson 
and Post were not unchallenged, and the charge against Johnson and Post’s 
‘regulation scepticism’ was led by Goldsmith primarily through his Against  
Cyberanarchy published in 1998.37
More recently, it has also been noted that, modern technology can work 
to strengthen ‘behavioral sovereignty’:
[P]owerful  states  are harnessing  these  [including  the  Internet]  and 
other technologies to enhance their own power over domestic society 
and international competitors. The development and use of sophistic-
ated reconnaissance satellites,  communications interception systems 
such  as  ECHELON,  cross-border  Internet  searches,  and  precision 
weapons are some examples of how the United States is enhancing its 
behavioral  sovereignty  –  and  diminishing  that  of  other  states  – 
through technology.38    
Nevertheless, the notion of the Internet as something beyond state sover-
eignty – a direct attack on the concept of sovereignty – remains remarkably 
persistent even though the calls for an unregulated ‘Wild Wild Web’ have 
largely died down.39
35 Menthe, D. C. 1998, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces, Michigan Tele-
communications and Technology Law Review 69, vol. 4, p. 83.
36 Menthe, D. C. 1998, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces, Michigan Tele-
communications and Technology Law Review 69, vol. 4, p. 74.
37 Goldsmith, J. L. 1998, Against Cyberanarchy, University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 65, p. 
1250.
38 Richard H. Steinberg, Who is Sovereign?, 40 Stanford Journal of International Law 330 (2004), 
at 339 (footnotes omitted).
39 See e.g. Joshua S. Bauchner, State Sovereignty and the Globalising Effect of the Internet, 26  
Brook. J. IntL. L. 689 (2000), at 689.
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5. OTHER (INDIRECT) ATTACKS ON SOVEREIGNTY
If we accept, as I think we need to do, Brownlie’s corollaries of sovereignty 
to include ‘a duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of 
other states’, we find a wealth of decisions by courts and legislative initiat-
ives from various states that arguably are inconsistent with the concept of 
sovereignty. For example, when the High Court of Australia decided that 
Victorian businessman Joseph Gutnick could take action in a Victorian court 
against US-based publisher Dow Jones, and have the defamation law of Vic-
toria determine the dispute,40 it clearly intervened in an area the US may 
claim exclusive jurisdiction over; that is, the freedom of speech of persons 
located within its  territory. After all,  Dow Jones had taken all  its actions 
within the US.
Australia is by no means unique in its approach and perhaps the most 
interesting  illustration  of  this  type  of  indirect  attacks  on  sovereignty  is 
found  in  the  protracted  dispute  between  some  Jewish  rights  groups  in 
France and US Internet company Yahoo! Inc.41
Put briefly, this transatlantic dispute between US Internet company, Ya-
hoo!,  and  two  French  associations,  La  Ligue  Contre  Le  Racisme  et 
L’Antisemitisme and L’Union Des Etudiants Juifs De Franc, related to Ya-
hoo!’s  operation of a website  which,  amongst  other things,  contained an 
auction service where Nazi memorabilia/junk was frequently on offer.42 The 
website could be described as the Yahoo! family’s ‘flagship’, and in contrast 
to the country-specific Yahoo! sites (e.g., www.yahoo.fr), this site was said 
to be aimed at the world at large.43 When La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et 
L’Antisemitisme et al. attempted to have Yahoo! remove the Nazi material  
from the auction service, in accordance with French penal Code,44 Yahoo! 
refused.
The French Court characterized Yahoo!’s activities as a tort (faute) and is-
sued a civil  law injunction based on the French Code of Civil Procedure. 
The Court  ruled that  Yahoo!  must  take  steps to prevent  French Internet 
40 Dow Jones & Company Inc. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 CLR 575.
41 Union of French Jewish Students (UEJF) v Yahoo! Inc. County Court of Paris, 20 November 
2000.
42 However, the auction service was not at all specifically designed for the purpose of auction 
Nazi material.
43 A notion backed by the fact that country-specific advertisement was provided on the site.
44 French Penal Code 1791 Article R645-1.
148 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 8:1
users from accessing the sections of the auction site containing Nazi memor-
abilia.45
In response to this, Yahoo! sought and obtained a summary judgment 
from a US court to the effect that US courts would not enforce the French 
decision. While acknowledging France’s right to make law for France, Fogel 
J. decided in Yahoo!’s favour, granting the summary judgment, declaring 
that the ‘First Amendment precludes enforcement within the United States 
of a French order intended to regulate the content of its speech over the In-
ternet.’46
The Yahoo! case, as well as the Gutnick case, illustrate a matter of funda-
mental importance; the Internet has created, or at least widened,  the gap 
between  reasonable  grounds  for  jurisdictional,  and  application  of  law, 
claims on the one hand and reasonable grounds for recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments on the other.47 Put differently, while the French 
Court in  Yahoo! and the Australian Court in  Gutnick may justify their ap-
proaches by reference to sovereignty, they arguably also violate the corol-
lary duty of non-intervention in the area of exclusive jurisdiction of other 
states.    
In a sense then, cases such as these can be seen both as strong assertions 
of sovereignty, and as violations of the corollary duty of non-intervention.
6. RARE EXAMPLES OF A PERSISTENT RESPECT FOR THE 
DUTY OF NON-INTERVENTION
The above should not be seen as suggesting a universal disregard of, or lack 
of faith in, the concept of sovereignty and the corollary duty of non-inter-
vention amongst courts and (other) law makers. Examples can, indeed, be 
found of courts and law makers showing reluctance to exercise jurisdiction 
45 International  League Against  Racism & Anti-Semitism (LICRA) v. Yahoo! Inc.  [2000] County 
Court of Paris.
46 Yahoo!, Inc. v La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F.Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 
2001), p. 22. See also:  Yahoo!,  Inc. v La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 
1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
47 The existence of this gap has long been acknowledged (see, e.g., A. A. Ehrenzweig, A Treat-
ise on the Conflict of Laws (St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1962) 8); and M. Wolff, Private Inter-
national Law (2nd edn, London, Oxford University Press, 1950) 53 (as reproduced in M. Ake-
hurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1973) 46 British Year Book of International Law, 238), 
stating: ‘every State is inclined to concede to its own courts a wider jurisdiction than it is  
prepared to recognize in foreign courts, and no rule of international law prevents States 
from establishing such discordance’. However, there is a surprising paucity of discussion of 
‘the gap’.
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over matters with foreign elements out of concern for how such an exercise 
of jurisdiction may impact the sovereignty of other states.
Looking at Australian law, a very clear example of such behaviour can 
be  found in  Macquarie  Bank Limited & Anor v Berg.48 There,  the Supreme 
Court of New South Wales had to decide whether to grant an injunction re-
straining the defendant from publishing allegedly defamatory material on a 
particular website.49 
The Court was clearly guided by the perception that “[o]nce published 
on the Internet material can be received anywhere, and it does not lie within 
the competence of the publisher to restrict the reach of the publication.”50 
Thus, despite the plaintiffs limiting the order sought to publications within 
New South Wales, Simpson J refused the order, stating that:
An injunction to restrain defamation in NSW s designed to ensure 
compliance  with  the  laws  of  NSW,  and  to  protect  the  rights  of 
plaintiffs, as those rights are defined by the law of NSW. Such an in-
junction is not designed to superimpose the law of NSW relating to 
defamation on every other state, territory and country of the world. 
Yet that would be the effect of an order restraining publication on the 
Internet. It is not to be assumed that the law of defamation in other 
countries is  coextensive with that of NSW, and indeed, one knows 
that it is not. It may very well be that according to the law of the Ba-
hamas,  Tazhakistan  [sic],  or  Mongolia,  the  defendant  has  an  un-
fettered right to publish the material.  To make an order interfering 
with such a right would exceed the proper limits of the use of the in -
junctive power of this court.51
This then is an example of how sovereignty and the corollary duty of 
non-intervention are seen to stand in the way of the effective regulation of 
the Internet.
48 [1999] NSWSC 526.
49 The matter was complicated by the fact that, the defendant in this action arguably was not  
the publisher of the allegedly defamatory website. During the proceedings a US resident, 
Fernando Adrian Sirio, stated in an affidavit that he was the responsible publisher, and that 
he had constructed the relevant website in conjunction with his studies at University of  
California, San Diego. It was, however, admitted that Mr Sirio had received some of the ma-
terial from Mr Berg.
50 Macquarie Bank Limited v Berg [1999] NSWSC 526 para 12. There will be reason to re-examine 
this perception below.
51 Macquarie Bank Limited v Berg [1999] NSWSC 526 para 14.
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7. GEO-LOCATION AS A ‘GAME-CHANGER’ IN THE 
CONTEXT OF SOVEREIGNTY
The three cases discussed above – Gutnick, Yahoo! and Macquarie Bank – are 
of interest also for reasons other than those already put forward. While de-
cided  virtually  simultaneously,  the  courts  in  the  Yahoo! case  and in  the 
Macquarie Bank case could not have taken more bi-polar approaches to the 
question of whether content may be restricted by reference to geographical 
criteria online. As seen in the quotes above, the Macquarie Bank court made a 
big point of the fact that “[o]nce published on the Internet material can be 
received anywhere, and it does not lie within the competence of the pub-
lisher to restrict the reach of the publication.”52 In sharp contrast, the Court 
in  Yahoo!, relying on expert testimonies, concluded that: “it may be estim-
ated in  practice  that  over  70% of the IP addresses  of  surfers  residing in 
French territory can be identified as being French.”53
In this part, I will  discuss the true state of the technologies that these 
courts looked at so differently. 
Since  2004, I  have written 14 articles  and notes,  and given numerous 
talks and conference presentations,  on the legal  implications of so-called 
geo-location technologies. The fact that I still get to publish on this topic is a 
strong testament to the insignificance of the impact my writings have had to 
date. However, geo-location technologies remain of significant legal import-
ance, not least for the topic of this paper. Indeed, I will here present argu-
ments  suggesting  that  geo-location  technologies  have  largely  neutralised 
the threat the Internet may have posed to the concept of sovereignty.
Today, we are in the unfortunate position that, while we all can see that 
access to Internet content is location-dependent,54 and while Internet com-
panies make significant use of location data,55 the law makers typically ig-
nore geo-location56 and lobbyists deny or emphasise such technologies as 
they see fit.57   
52 Macquarie Bank Limited v Berg [1999] NSWSC 526 para 12.
53 International League Against Racism & Anti-Semitism (LICRA) and the Union of French Jewish  
Students (UEJF) v Yahoo! Inc. County Court of Paris, interim court order of 20th of November 
2000. However, it would seem that one of the experts, Ben Laurie, later felt a need to explain 
his  statement.  (Ben  Laurie  ‘An  Expert’s  Apology’  at http://www.apache-ssl.org/apo-
logy.html).
54 See e.g. the difference in search results one gets when ‘googling’ for the same search term in 
different countries (try to search for the term “car” for example).
55 There is an ever increasing amount of location-based and location-aware online services, such 
as Google Maps, Ovi, Foursquare and HTCSense.com.
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However, the technological reality is that, where they use geo-location 
technologies,  providers  of  Internet  content  can  effectively  limit  the  geo-
graphical  distribution  of  their  content.  In  2007,  the  Court  in  ACLU  v  
Gonzales58 reviewed expert testimony relating to Quova’s geo-location tech-
nologies, and noted the following: 
A product that Quova markets can determine, within a 20 to 30 mile 
radius, the location from which a user is accessing a Web site through 
a proxy server, satellite connection, or large corporate proxy. The fact 
that Quova can only narrow down a user’s location to a 20 to 30 mile 
radius results in Quova being unable to determine with 100 percent 
accuracy which side of a city or state border a user lives on if the user 
lives close to city or state borders. If a visitor is accessing a Web site 
through AOL, Quova can only determine whether the person is on 
the East or West coast of the United States. Quova has been used by 
Web site operators to direct traffic so that only users in the United 
States can view products that can only be distributed in the United 
States and to customize content for users in the United States as op-
posed to users in a another country. The services Quova offers can 
cost anywhere from $6,000 to $500,000 a year.59
Another provider, Digital Element, claims that its product  NetAcuity is 
over 99.9% accurate at a country level and over 95% accurate at a city-level, 
worldwide.60 
56 For instance, in 2010, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down its decision in the 
joined cases of Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & KG (Case C-585/08) and Hotel Alpen-
hof GesmbH v Oliver Heller (Case C-144/09). The key question, common to both cases, was 
whether the fact that a website can be consulted on the Internet in the Member State of the 
consumer’s  domicile  is  sufficient  to  justify  a  finding  that  commercial  or  professional 
activities are being directed to that Member State within the meaning of Article 15(1)(c) of 
Regulation No 44/2001. Importantly, one of the parties – Hotel Alpenhof – had argued that 
“[a]ccount should be taken of the characteristics of the internet, which makes it impossible  
to restrict information to Austrian territory.” (Opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak de-
livered on 18 May 2010, para 32). It is remarkable that, neither the Advocate General, nor 
the Court, recognised the need to discuss this absurd denial of the existence of geo-location 
technologies. After all, few matters can have greater bearing on the question of whether the  
relevant activities had been ‘directed to the consumers’ forum country or not.
57 For example, lobbying in relation to the Rome II Regulation, Amazon.com stated that: “[I]t is 
impossible for an on-line company to verify even where any one website visitor is based,  
and therefore which country’s non-contractual law should apply under Rome II.” (European  
Commission (JHA) Consultation on a Preliminary draft Proposal for a Council Regulation on the  
law applicable to Non-contractual  Obligations (“Rome II” Regulation) Response of Amazon.com 
(Sept.  2002)  available  at  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/rome_ii/contri-
butions/amazon_com_en.pdf)
58 ACLU v Gonzales, 478 F Supp 2d 775 (ED Pa 2007).
59 ACLU v Gonzales, 478 F Supp 2d 775 (ED Pa 2007), paras 182-186.
60 Digital  Element  ‘NetAcuity  IP Location Technology’  available  at   http://www.digitalele-
ment.com/our_technology/our_technology.html.
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The impact such technologies has on the concept of sovereignty should 
be obvious to everyone – by bringing back the relevance of geography and 
national territorial borders to the Internet landscape, they also bring back 
the validity of sovereignty of national territories as the foundation for regu-
lation.  
8. TIME TO RE-THINK THE CONCEPT OF ‘SOVEREIGNTY’?
The fact that geo-location technologies have brought back geography to the 
formerly ‘borderless’  and ‘location-independent’  Internet must not neces-
sarily be seen as a conclusive victory for the concept of sovereignty we have 
grown accustomed to. 
After all, technology changes constantly and inevitably. Should we find 
ourselves in a situation marked by widespread and effective circumvention 
of  geo-location  technologies,  the  effect  such  technologies  have  on  the 
concept of sovereignty will change.
Further, several other problems remain with the application of the cur-
rent  conception  of  sovereignty  to  Internet  activities,  and  traditional  fo-
cal-points may need to be reconsidered. 
In light of this, it makes sense to re-evaluate the concept of sovereignty, 
without for that sake throwing out the proverbial baby with the proverbial 
bath water.
9. DOCTRINE OF “MARKET SOVEREIGNTY” BASED ON THE 
EFFECTIVE REACH OF “MARKET DESTROYING MEASURES” 
– A POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD?
In discussions of Internet jurisdiction, it is commonly noted that the real im-
pact of effective extraterritorial jurisdictional claims is severally limited by 
the intrinsic difficulty of enforcing such claim. For example, like many other 
commentators, Goldsmith and Wu note that: “[w]ith few exceptions gov-
ernments can use their coercive powers only within their borders and con-
trol offshore Internet communications only by controlling local intermediar-
ies, local assets, and local persons.”61 
I would advocate the removal of the word “only” from the quoted state-
ment made by Goldsmith and Wu so as to end up with the following sen-
tence  instead:  with  few exceptions governments  can use  their  coercive  powers  
within their borders and control offshore Internet communications by controlling  
61 Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? 159 (2008) (emphasis added).
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local intermediaries, local assets, and local persons. Such an alteration changes 
the nature of this statement from what unflatteringly can be called a relat-
ively uninteresting cliché to a highly useful description of principles well-
established at least 400 years ago.  
The word “only” gives the impression that such powers are of limited 
significance  for  the  overall  question  of  such  jurisdictional  claims  –  and 
thereby for the concept of sovereignty – which is misleading. What I am get-
ting at here is that the power governments have within their territorial bor-
ders, and over their nationals, can be put to great effect against offshore In-
ternet communications.  A government determined to have an impact  on 
foreign Internet actors that are beyond its sovereignty and directly effective 
jurisdictional  reach  may introduce  what  we  can  call  “market  destroying 
measures” to penalise the foreign party. For example, it may introduce sub-
stantive law allowing its courts to, due to the foreign party’s actions and 
subsequent refusal to appear before the court, make a finding that:
• that party is not allowed to trade within the jurisdiction in question;
• debts owed to that party are unenforceable within the jurisdiction 
in question; and/or
• parties within the control of that government (e.g. residents or cit-
izens) are not allowed to trade with the foreign party.
In light of this type of market destroying measures, the enforceability of 
extraterritorial jurisdictional claims – and by extension, the sovereignty of 
nation states – may not be as limited as it may seem at a first glance. 
In this context, it is interesting to connect to the thinking of 17th century 
legal  scholars,  exemplified  by  Hugo  Grotius  (Hugo  de  Groot).  Grotius 
stated that:
It seems clear, moreover, that sovereignty over a part of the sea is ac-
quired in the same way as sovereignty elsewhere, that is, [...] through 
the instrumentality of persons and territory. It is gained through the 
instrumentality of persons if, for example, a fleet, which is an army 
afloat, is stationed at some point of the sea; by means of territory, in 
so far as those who sail over the part of the sea along the coast may be 
constrained from the land no less than if  they should be upon the 
land itself.62  
62 Hugo Grotius on the Law of War and Peace 96 (Stephen C. Neff ed., 2012), at 112.
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A similar reasoning can usefully be applied in relation to sovereignty in 
the context of the Internet, at least in some contexts. Instead of focusing on 
the location of persons, acts, or physical things – as is traditionally done for 
jurisdictional  purposes – we ought to focus on marketplace control – on 
what we can call “market sovereignty”. A state has market sovereignty and, 
therefore justifiable jurisdiction, over Internet conduct where it can effect-
ively exercise “market destroying measures” over the market to which the 
conduct relates.63 Importantly, emphasis is here placed on control of the rel-
evant market rather than over the relevant conduct.64
Admittedly, allowing extraterritorial jurisdictional claims based on the 
doctrine of market sovereignty put forward here gives rise to wide claims of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. This could be seen as problematic. At the same 
time, where the violation of the law of a state merely results in such market 
destroying measures, foreign defendants can comfortably carry on dealing 
with other markets should they not wish to comply with the laws of that 
state – importantly, the laws of one state do not impose on foreign parties 
not interested in the market place to which that law applies, and if a party 
wishes to engage on the market in question, it can hardly complain about 
having to comply with the same laws that apply to all other actors on that 
market.65 Along a similar vein, it would seem peculiar for foreign states to 
complain about extraterritorial claims of jurisdiction where such claims are 
only pursued in relation to market destroying measures; after all, the regu-
lation in question is then strictly limited to parties engaging in the market 
place over which the law maker in question has sovereignty. 
Now let us connect all this to the Brazilian matter introduced above. The 
course set by the Brazilian court fits quite well with the doctrine of market 
sovereignty put forward here, and the steps the Court threatened to take fall 
squarely  within  the  market  destroying  measures  listed  above.  But  what 
63 The exercise of such measures must necessarily be carried out in a non-discriminatory man-
ner and will doubtless give rise to interesting questions under e.g. GATS, and possibly un-
der EU anti-discriminatory measures. However, those discussions, while interesting in the 
extreme, go beyond the scope of this paper.
64 An example may be illustrative. A company in state A is selling goods to people in state B 
via the Internet. In such a scenario, state A may put an end to the company’s activity by 
making it unlawful to sell such goods to state B. Leaving aside  the obvious exception of 
situations where such a ban would violate some international agreement, this is uncontro-
versial. However, state B may also claim jurisdiction over the conduct by reference to its 
market sovereignty as it potentially can put an end to the company’s activity by implement-
ing market destroying measures.
65 It will clearly be necessary to define what is meant by a “market.” However, guidance for 
such a venture could perhaps be gained e.g. from the field of antitrust law.
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about  the concern that  courts  ought  to  be careful  in  threatening  to shut 
down entire platforms over individual disputes? 
In my view, the starting point must be a realisation that companies can-
not be above the law simply due to the fact that society needs their services; 
after all, societies often depend on a range of private companies, like energy 
companies etc and we cannot let them be above the law. At the same time 
online businesses are commonly (intentionally or unintentionally) exposed 
to the laws of virtually every country on the planet, and the introduction of  
the doctrine of market sovereignty may be a useful mechanism for delineat-
ing which countries laws such companies should abide by. Companies such 
as Facebook must then take steps to ensure that their technical structures al-
lows for compliance with multiple laws.  
10. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above has highlighted the existence of two schools of thought on the re-
lationship between the concept of sovereignty on the one hand, and the In-
ternet on the other. Some, such as Simpson J in Macquarie Bank has seen sov-
ereignty as an obstacle to the effective reach of jurisdiction over Internet 
conduct. Others, have either viewed the Internet as a direct challenge to the 
concept of sovereignty as did Barlow, Menthe, Johnson and Post, or have 
mounted more indirect attacks on the application of the concept of sover-
eignty in the online context.
Importantly, these schools of thought share a common under-appreci-
ation of the impact of geo-location technologies. To date, the introduction of 
geo-location technologies has worked as a ‘game-changer’ by re-introducing 
the relevance of location and by making it possible for providers of Internet 
content to limit the geographical distribution of that content. And while one 
can imagine counter-movements (e.g. driven by the aim of anonymity), in 
light of this, current Internet technology does no longer pose any real threat 
to the concept of sovereignty.
At the same time, it is argued that the time has come to reconsider the 
concept of sovereignty as applied in the Internet context, and a doctrine of 
“market sovereignty” backed up by “market destroying measures” is intro-
duced. I hasten to acknowledge, however, that this doctrine and the argu-
ments in its favour are introduced here in an insufficiently developed form, 
and are merely hoped to highlight the direction of a potential future path.
